BRICS, a term coined by U.S. banker Jim O’Neill, was initially regarded as an institution representing emerging markets that would inject momentum into the world economy at the dawn of the new century. Later, it evolved into a mechanism for these emerging economies to collaborate and capitalize on the opportunities of globalization. However, since 2017, amid rising populism and trade protectionism in the U.S., BRICS has increasingly been perceived by the Global South as a non-Western bloc—a potential alternative to the Western-dominated international order. A recent BRICS summit in Brazil voiced “serious concerns about the rise of unilateral tariff and non-tariff measures which distort trade and are inconsistent with WTO rules,” clearly positioning itself amid the uncertainties of the global tariff war.
Since its expansion into BRICS+ in 2023, the group’s combined GDP now exceeds one-third of the global total, while its population accounts for 48% of the world, making it the most active and dynamic segment of the global market. Geographically, from a Western perspective, BRICS+—which includes China, Russia, and Iran—has been framed as an “anti-hegemonic coalition”, a concept reminiscent of the late strategist Zbigniew Brzezinski’s warnings. For Cold War survivors, this might evoke unsettling memories, given the bloc’s formidable economic and natural resource base, which rivals—if not surpasses—that of the West.
However, BRICS+ is neither an alternative to Western dominance nor a coalition against the current world order. It is not a geopolitical tool wielded by its most powerful members to carve the world into spheres of influence. Crucially, BRICS+ is not a homogeneous bloc united by shared ideologies or cultural traditions. Instead, it encompasses the widest spectrum of diversities in ethnicity, history, and religion. As such, it is highly unlikely for BRICS+ to adopt a consistent, collective stance against an imagined adversary, let alone function as an anti-West alliance.
Rooted in a consensus of non-interventionism, BRICS+ seeks to maximize economic benefits through strengthened collaboration while mitigating the uncertainties of the post-2008 financial crisis era. With the recent surge in populism and trade protectionism, Global South countries have even greater incentives to join such a platform to enhance their economic resilience.
That said, BRICS+ is not a panacea for current global challenges. While it has gained momentum in advocating for reforms to the international financial and trade order, its efforts over the past two decades have yielded limited results. The New Development Bank (NDB), one of BRICS+’s most notable initiatives, was only moderately rated “AA” with a “stable” outlook by Fitch in 2025, citing concerns over loan concentration within BRICS countries and lingering risks in Russian loan performance. Despite its vision of “mutual respect, sovereign equality, solidarity, democracy, openness, inclusiveness, collaboration, and consensus”, BRICS+ has proven too egalitarian to establish strong leadership—unlike the Franco-German axis in the EU—rendering it incapable of implementing feasible agreements or forging long-term strategies. In short, while its grand vision is ambitious, the roadmap to achieve it remains tentative and fragmented.
Since its inception, BRICS+ has never evolved into a tightly integrated mechanism capable of coordinating internal trade or investment policies to “de-risk” reliance on Western markets. Unlike the EU, none of its founding members have signed bilateral or multilateral free trade agreements—a goal that does not appear strategically prioritized in the foreseeable future. These members are not bound by legally enforceable agreements, and their participation in BRICS+ is often more opportunistic than deeply committed.
Moreover, BRICS+ has never collectively imposed sanctions or embargoes against Western countries. The declarations issued at its annual summits are highly symbolic and carefully worded, avoiding rhetoric that might provoke Western backlash. A telling example was the Brazil Summit, where a draft statement warning against tariff wars was softened after former U.S. President Donald Trump threatened higher tariffs on BRICS+ members. The bloc ultimately stepped back, and the rhetoric was dialed down.
Furthermore, BRICS+ members often diverge on key issues due to differing geopolitical and trade priorities. For instance, when Russia proposed a BRICS+ payment system to bypass SWIFT in 2024, it faced reluctance from India and lukewarm interest from China. For these two economies—deeply integrated into the global financial and trading systems—adopting an alternative payment system would risk decoupling them from their major trading partners.
At best, BRICS+ can be seen as a loosely organized platform promoting pluralism in global governance, addressing issues where Western powers show declining interest—such as green transition and infrastructure finance. Yet, its achievements should not be underestimated. It represents the Global South’s determination to push for a fairer global playing field. Despite its inability to coordinate cohesive policies, BRICS+ facilitates multilateral and bilateral dialogues, amplifies its members’ voices, and addresses urgent agendas. Additionally, the bloc has undeniably streamlined trade relations among members, yielding tangible economic benefits.
BRICS+ is just one of many attempts by the Global South to assert itself, much like the Non-Aligned Movement of the 1960s and 1970s, when post-colonial nations sought balance between the Soviet bloc and the West. Today, on the cusp of a post-economic colonialism era, BRICS+ is their latest—but not final—endeavor.
About author
Roger Woo is a columnist based in Beijing and former Research Fellow at the Center for China and Globalization in Beijing. His work focuses on global governance, economic policy, and industrial policy research, and he regularly contributes to various news outlets as a freelancer.
